will unwarranted occasional assertions that the growth achieved in the years before then was not real or rapid, even though Haws were already visible behind the sup posed 'economic miracle' in all countries of the region, including Japan. As well, China and the other highly authoritarian communist states of the region will be left out of account here, as will the two maverick cases of Myanmar (Burma) and Brunei.
No Simple Link
Taiwan and South Korea were certainly authoritarian regimes in die earlier phases of their post-independence economic development. A causal connection seems to have been at work, since die two strong state systems were able to get rapid growdi started well before most odier countries, for reasons oudined below. After experi encing rapid economic growdi for over 20 years, each country developed a large middle class which played a major part in die struggles in die 1980s to achieve more democratic insdtutions, which now seem to be securely established. Thailand was also an audioritarian regime at die lime when its rapid growdi phase started in die 1950-60s, although it was never such a 'strong' state as Taiwan and South Korea. It too began to change gradually towards a more democradc form of government from die mid-1970s onwards, especially during its 1986-96 boom years. The grad ual consolidadon of its political pardes and parliamentary system, diough badly flawed by 'money polidcs', was sufficient to defeat a military coup d 'etat in 1992 and to establish party-based parliamentary governments since dien.
Japan, on die odier hand, has, throughout its five decades of astonishingly rapid growdi, had a formally democradc set of political insdtudons, which were imposed under the postwar US occupadon. Yet its system of government could not be said to have become significandy more responsive to social demands and pressures during diat time, or more democratic or participatory, or capable of curbing die immense power of the bureaucracy, likewise, Malaysia and Singapore have long had die formal trappings of democracy which diey inherited as Bridsh colonies about 40 years ago; but die actual praedee of representadve government diere has not become in any sense more democratic as diey have grown wealdiier: if anydiing, die reverse. Singapore is in praedee a highly audioritarian one-party regime, and Malaysia semi-democradc, or 'responsive-authoritarian' (Crouch, 1996) at best, despite dieir high growth rates, die highest per capita income levels in Soudieast Asia, and large middle classes. The Philippines also inherited a set of democradc insdtudons, on a US-style congressional model, widi pardes and regular elecdons; yet it has experienced fluctuadons towards a dictatorship under Ferdinand Marcos (1972-86) and back towards a radier chaodc, ineffectual democradc regime since then, dius defying any clear-cut generalisadon about die links between growdi and democracy.
Indonesia has been die most striking cxcepdon to any such proposidon, for its rapid economic growdi during 1966-97 gave rise to an immense increase in die power of die state, largely concentrated in die hands of President Suharto himself, widiin a highly personal and patrimonialist system of government and at the ex-pense of the civil society. Hence, growth has been accompanied there by a weaken ing of representative institutions (the word democracy is hardly relevant in the In donesian context) rather than the reverse. from this bald survey, it is clear that no simple link is discernible between eco nomic development and democratisation in the fast-growth countries of eastern Asia. While there is some evidence in favour of such a proposition in the cases of 1 aiwan, South Korea and Thailand, the opposite is the case for Indonesia, Singa pore and Malaysia. Other variables have to be taken into account in each case.
'Democracy' and 'Democratisation' Something more must be said at this point about the meaning attributed here to terms like democracy and democratisation'. (The latter is less problematic since it simply means a process of change broadly in the direction of democracy.) Both terms are used here loosely and generally, descriptively rather than normatively, to indicate how nearly any particular regime approximates to an ideally democratic system of government in which the executive power is responsive to the views, pref erences and demands of die people, as expressed dirough institutions such as elec tions, political parties, a parliament or congress and a set of rules to ensure diat the executive is periodically accountable to die parliament or die people. The cases of Singapore, Malaysia and Japan, as mentioned above, which all appeal to values odier dian diose of conventional Western 'liberal democracy', indicate clearly that it is not just die presence or absence of those institutions that matters most but the ways in which formally democratic institutions actually work. Equally important are die more deeply rooted social attitudes and values which imbue diem, particularly on issues such as freedom of expression and die press, the autonomy of die courts, die beliefs of bodi governments and citizens about human rights, legal and civil rights and obligations, and ideas about die individual and die community, society and state, all of which vary widely diroughout die developing world.
The term 'illiberal democracies' has been coined by Fareed Zakaria (1997) to refer to regimes (mainly in die Balkans, Africa and Central Asia, but applicable also to some Soudieast Asian countries) diat hold free elections but do not respect the rights of dieir citizens. Zakaria (1997) urges a greater emphasis on reviving consti tutionalism and die rule of law radier dian die 'fixation on ballot boxes' (Kupchan, 1998:122) . Yet according to Kupchan, 'die current wave of democratisation is tak ing place in regions which have litde or no experience in constitutional liberalism' but radier 'a long history of paternalism and social norms that privilege die group over the individual. Kupchan disagrees with Zakaria's advocacy of promoting con stitutionalism before democracy, arguing that liberalism has preceded democracy only in die Anglo-Saxon West where 'political culture, practices and institutions were already imbued with die spirit of constitutional liberalism' long before democ racy took root diere. He urges diat even an imperfect democracy can serve 'as a beachhead for liberal values, not vice versa' and that 'illiberal democracy may be a way station along die road to more benign forms of government... from autocracy towards liberalising autocracy, and in some cases towards liberalising semi-democracy ' (1998:123) . This aspect of the subject, though a most important one, cannot be adequately explored here, for die related question of 'Asian values' in all this is a complex and subde one. But it should be kept in mind as we explore the factors involved in whatever explanatory model may be advanced about economic growth and progress towards democratisation.
Is Authoritarianism a Necessary Condition of Growth?
The proposition diat strong government and curbs on civil and political liberties were essential for initiating growdi rested on die belief diat only an audioritarian regime could impose unpopular but necessary policies involving industrial disci pline, resistance to high wage levels, suppression of militant trade unions and peas ant organisations: in short, insuladon from die demands of special interest groups. High levels of governmental autonomy seemed to be necessary in die early stages of growth and 'primidve accumuladon of capital' in order to avoid die weaknesses of what Gunnar Myrdal (1968) Dependency theorists were inclined to use diis sort of argument to support dieir belief diat die ruling elites of those countries were being covertly manipulated by huge foreign muldnadonal corporations which were diought to be acdng in col lusion widi the elites to advance die interests of both pardes at die expense of the rest of die population (die workers and peasants in particular) so as to enmesh the economies of diose countries into die global capitalist system. There was a grain of truth in diat argument, although die cruder claims about die dominance of foreign capital and subservience of die state to it were later seen to be misleading. Singa pore, for example, has relied heavily on foreign capital, yet die Peoples Action Party government has proved to be highly autonomous, insulated from society-based pressure groups, patendy not the servant of cidier multinational corporations or domestic capitalists but dieir master. In die early stages of development of Taiwan and Soudi Korea, foreign direct investment played a relatively small part (although foreign aid from die US and overseas loans were crucial) and die governments of diose countries were highly autonomous.
More sophisticated variants on die growdi-audioritarianism dieme emerged in die 1980s widi Chalmers Johnson's (1987) influential 'developmental state' theory, based on his interpretation of die structural basis of rapid growdi in Japan and the newly industrialising countries (NICs) Soudi Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong (a very disparate array of politico-economic systems), and an interpretation in terms of 'growdi coalitions' as die political basis of fast growdi in diose countries by Stephan Haggard and Cheng Tun-jen (1987).
Johnson's idea of the 'developmental state' was not concerned directly either with die audioritarianism-democratisation debate (for the prospects of democratisa tion would have seemed bleak in Taiwan and South Korea when he first used the term in 1981) regarding necessary and sufficient conditions for development, or widi die growdi-democratisation nexus, so much as with die question of how the political elites in diose countries had avoided capture by dieir major clients, espe cially privately owned big business. But he did stress die 'strong state' feature of diese countries in die course ol showing die importance of government intervendon in economic life in Japan, Soudi Korea and Taiwan, contrary to die views of laissezfaire economists who stressed only on dieir reliance on market forces and exportoriented economic policies. But die model he advanced also focused on four main elements behind die economic success of die Asian NICs: stable rule by a polidcal-bureaucradc elite not acceding to political demands which would have undermined economic growdi; cooperation between public and private sectors under die overall guidance of a pilot planning agency; heavy and continuing investment in education for everyone, com bined widi policies to ensure equitable distribution of die wealdi created by high-speed growdi; and a government diat understands the need to use and respect the methods of economic intervention based on the price mecha nism. (Johnson, 1987:145) Haggard and Cheng (1987) put forward a less muscle-bound variant of die de velopmental state dieory in dieir study of Taiwan, Soudi Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore, die dien generally accepted group of Asian NICs. They too stressed die 'insulated' character of die state in all four NICs, but put more emphasis than John son did on die part played also by repression of workers and labour organisations. I heir main contribution was to show how various 'growdi coalitions' widiin elite and business circles had come to reject import-substituting industry policies and to support export-oriented growdi based on market-conforming modes of government intervention in economic life. They drew on dependency dieory in dieir stress on die triangular relationship between die domestic bourgeoisie, foreign capital and the state as die key players determining die formulation of export-led growdi strategies. But diey were not die prisoners eidier of old Marxist assumptions diat the eco nomic success of diese countries was due mainly to die exploitation of the workers through low wage levels, or of die dependency-dieory belief that the governments and business elites ol diese countries were hand-in-glove widi foreign capitalists to whom diey were beholden. The value of dieir approach to the analysis of die socio political dynamics of economic policy-making in die NICs lay in providing an ac count ol die relatively autonomous 'strong' state which led towards a more flexible and nuanced view ol die relationship between state and society in diese countries. This approach was not invalidated when Taiwan and South Korea suddenly and surprisingly shifted towards more democratic regimes in 1985-87, for the study of the state-society balance and business-government relations in die processes of eco-nomic policy-making which flowed out of their work has become much more di verse, flexible and illuminating not only for those two countries but also for others in the region.
Yet applying either the 'developmental state' or the 'growth coalitions' approach to Soudieast Asia creates difficulties, quite apart from the special problems posed by Singapore as a Southeast Asian NIC (Mackie, 1988) . For example, Thailand, formerly considered the archetypal 'bureaucratic polity' which was highly insulated from social pressures, could not be accurately described in terms of Johnson's de velopmental state dieory even in the years of intensely authoritarian rule by military juntas before 1973. Subsequently, its phases of most rapid economic growth have occurred since the 'democratic interlude' of 1973-76 and the decline in state auton omy. That was followed, after a brief phase of return to military rule, by gradual steps towards democratisation and rejection of military intervention in government during the 1980s under General Prem Tinsulanond, especially during die boom years 1986-96. The government and its policies were never dominated by US or Japanese private capital, even though foreign direct investment rose steadily during diat period and dien very rapidly after 1986 (Pasuk & Baker, 1996) . Likewise, Ma laysia has never had an especially 'strong', audioritarian or 'insulated' state since independence, aldiough it has at best been only a semi-democradc one; yet it has had steadily high growdi rates ever since the late 1950s (Crouch, 1996) . Wages have not been kept low diere, as in die developmental state model, and the influ ence of Bridsh capital has declined steadily since die 1970s. The Philippines and Indonesia have had even more complex patterns of economic and polidcal devel opment since 1945, which can be explained only in terms of dieir particular cir cumstances, in defiance of dependency dieory or developmental state models radier dian in accordance widi diem (Mackie, 1993 (Mackie, /1998 ).
Thus we are left widi two unresolved problems here -and perhaps odiers that flow from them. First, if it is not die case diat highly audioritarian regimes have been more easily able to get growdi started than reladvely democratic ones (however we may define diese terms; it is better to diink of them loosely as opposite poles of a spectrum rather dian as sharply dichotomous), what are the polidcal underpin nings of economic growdi? This is not die place to go into diat quesdon at any length, since it is die obverse of our primary concern here, which is widi die polid cal consequences of growdi, not its causes or precondidons. I have tried to investi gate die latter elsewhere (Mackie, 1988) with reference to die (dien) ASEAN states, but it is sufficient simply to note one very general observation here.
Audioritarian states have obviously not been successful in generating growth in many countries in Africa, the Middle East and elsewhere, while several in die AsiaPacific region have successfully achieved high growth rates without having highly audioritarian regimes (Thailand most obviously, Malaysia and the Philippines less so). But while authoritarian government may not be a sufficient condition for rapid growth to occur, it may arguably be a necessary condition for getting the growth process started, by enabling governments to hold down wage levels, generate high savings and investment levels, and direct scarce capital towards infrastructure and human capital rather than consumption. It is hard to identify any countries which have achieved high growth rates without relatively audioritarian regimes, apart from the radier special case of die Philippines in die 1950-60s, where die role of US capi tal, aid and policy advice was substantial.
But perhaps it was not authoritarianism as such that was critical to the initial growdi process so much as 'insulated' or autonomous governments and a high de gree of bureaucratic competence. Equally important may have been the ability of governments in Taiwan, Soudi Korea and Singapore to avoid 'capture' by eidier rent-seeking business firms or radical unions, and so to enforce die rules of die game that kept markets competitive and a level playing field). Those conditions did not apply in the Philippines under Marcos, or in Indonesia under Suharto, al though markets were liberalised to some extent and growdi generated at lower lev els. Malaysia benefited from a very competent bureaucratic structure, a relatively open trade regime, and not too much 'capture' by special interest groups in the early stages of development.
Second, what can be said about die links, if any, between economic growdi and pressures for democratic reform, whedier successful or not, from various elements within the society? I want to approach diis question by, first, examining the impor tance ol die middle class as a key element in die socio-political chemistry involved; second, by touching briefly on Samuel Huntington's analysis of die post-1970 Third Wave' of transitions lrom audioritarian to democratic regimes diroughout the world; and finally by turning to die problems of applying diis kind of explana tion to die five original ASEAN countries.
Growth, the Middle Class and Democratisation
It is commonly asserted diat democratising tendencies in developing countries are due wholly or largely to die growdi of a middle class, educated, urbanised and bound up widi die modern world, upholding die prevailing ideas and (in part) ide ologies ol dieir counterparts in more advanced industrialised societies. Members of die middle class have a stronger interest dian most odier social groups in pressing audioritarian regimes to widen and strengdien die civil liberties of dieir citizens, to minimise die arbitrary audiority of officialdom or the military, and to move towards a rule-based administration and die rule of law. Even if they do not go so far as to press strongly for fully 'democratic' forms of government (for they may find diemselves outvoted by die workers or peasants in a genuinely democratic electoral sys tem, or severely repressed by military or right-wing elements in audioritarian re gimes if diey push too far), diey are likely to be broadly in favour of reforms in die direction of a more accountable executive power diat is responsive to pressures from social groups, if only to cope widi die greater complexity of policy-making in an increasingly industrialised society. But while die strengdi of middle class ele ments in developing countries may be correlated to some extent with the levels of industrialisation, urbanisation and education prevailing in a particular country, we cannot assume diere is an automatic or inevitable process at work here which leads towards a strengthening ol democratisation tendencies. The Philippines, for in-stance, had by far die largest and best educated middle class in Southeast Asia in the 1960s at die very time when Marcos plunged die country into mardal law and a highly regressive dictatorship, widi surprisingly litde effective resistance from die middle class (and even much support).
The various studies of 'transitions from audioritarianism' by O 'Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead (1986), mosdy in southern Europe or South America, were of value in pointing beyond simplistic generalisations about the growth of a middle class as a factor in democratisation towards die interactions and negotiating processes diat take place within authoritarian regimes between various political ac tors botli inside and outside die state structure who are involved in struggles to alter or retain die status quo. They were particularly good in their analysis of die com plex politics of negotiation diere between die duros and blaiicos (hard-liners and soft-liners) as to die choice of repressive or accommodating policies towards oppo nents of the state. In nearly all cases where transitions from authoritarian rule have occurred, the rifts between duros and blancos have at times provided enough scope for the advocates of change to be able to drive wedges between diem and make limited gains in die direction of more democratic political institutions.
Just as die widespread failures of democratic systems in developing countries in die years alter 1958 and die emergence of audioritarian regimes there attracted a lot of attention among Western political scientists at that time, die pendulum has swung in die opposite direction since die 1970s. Huntington's (1991) 'Third W ave' study of die circumstances surrounding die numerous shifts towards democratic governments diroughout die world since about 1970 provides one of die most comprehensive studies of die various factors which help to account for diis trend across the world, of which economic growth and die emergence of an educated middle class are merely two, and not necessarily die most decisive ones. lik e die 'transitions' analysts, Huntington highlights die roles played by political actors on bodi sides, as well as die prevailing economic circumstances widiin which diey had to act. On the relevance of levels of economic development to die probability of achieving democratic reforms, he observ es diat:
Very rapid economic growth inevitably produced challenges for audioritar ian leaders. It did not necessarily lead them to introduce democracy ... Over the long term, economic development creates die basis for demo cratic regimes. In die short term, very rapid economic growth and eco nomic crises may undermine audioritarian regimes. If economic growth occurs widiout economic crisis democracy evolves slowly, as it did in nineteendi century Europe. If die destabilising growdi or economic crisis oc curs widiout die achievement of transition zone wealdi, audioritarian re gimes may fall, but dieir replacement widi long-lived democratic regimes is highly problematic. In die diird wave, die combination of substantial levels of economic development and short-term economic crisis or failure was die economic formula most favourable to die transition from audioritarian to democratic government. (Huntington, 1991:72) While not very elegantly expressed, this extract does underline the important point that any search for correlations between growth and democratisation needs to look well beyond any simple one-to-one relationship towards, lor example, the role of crises in destabilising audioritarian regimes (and thereby opening up opportuni ties for the advocates of democratisation) and the conditions determining the sus tainability of democratic governments once diey are established.
The Growth-Democratisation Nexus in Southeast Asia
In the most thorough and sustained enquiry yet made into the correlation between economic development and democratisation tendencies in the major countries of East and Soudieast Asia, Crouch and Morley (1998) have shown that while Lipset's observation quoted earlier (that the wealthier a nation 'the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy') is broadly true of diis region, diere are some notable ex ceptions. Three of the four countries with die highest per capita income levels in the region in the 1990s -Japan, Taiwan and South Korea -are classified as 'consolidated democracies', while die fourdi, Singapore, is categorised as 'audioritarian-responsive', even diough its income levels are nearly twice diose of Taiwan and diree dmes Soudi Korea's. At die other end of die scale, China, Viet nam and Myanmar, all still in die low-income category, have audioritarian regimes of various types. O f die middle-income countries, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines are classed as formally democratic, despite various imperfecdons, but Indonesia, die poorest of diem, is regarded as 'audioritarian-military', despite its high growdi rates over die last 30 years and despite die fact diat it had earlier had more dian a decade of vigorously democradc, party-based parliamentary govern ment in the years 1945-59, at a dme of much lower per capita income levels dian in die 1990s.
One of the conclusions diat Crouch and Morley (1998) 
It is not accidental diat medium levels of economic growdi are commonly associated widi instability, most polidcal regimes weaving between audiori tarian structures and [merely! formal democracies, while die higher levels are generally correlated widi democracy ... These correladons would ap pear to be in large part die effects of die growdi process itself, mediated dirough die social and polidcal processes it generates ...
Beyond this point, die analytical problem becomes partly a matter of explaining die anomalous cases of Singapore and Indonesia (and to a lesser extent Malaysia and the Philippines), while also depiedng a more refined and flexible explanatory model for die observable patterns of socio-polidcal change. Using what is essendally Karl Deutsch's nodon of social mobilisadon as a key element in die equadon, Crouch and Morley (1998) have put forward a stylised explanadon in terms of what they call die 'driven-by-growdi model', subject to the assumption that all odier factors are equal, which is a very important qualification (since they rarely are equal in this part of the world), as follows:
Economic development drives social mobilisation; Social mobilisation drives political mobilisation; Political mobilisation drives regime change.
Not all regime changes will result in democratisation, however, at least as it is un derstood in the West, and it would be erroneous to treat this 'model' in too deter ministic a manner by implying that democratisation is an inevitable outcome o f ei ther economic development as such or the social or political mobilisation it gener ates. Other variables must also be brought into account, particularly ideologies, 'Asian values' and institutional factors such as the role of the armed forces, the strength or weakness of political parties, freedom of the press, the competence of bureaucracies, the autonomy of the judiciary and older traditions about individual freedom vis-ä-vis the community. Authoritarian regimes can be expected to respond to the pressures generated by social and political mobilisation in different ways, some moving towards more representative or democratic directions, oilier creating new institutions which will enable them to accommodate pressures from below without making concessions towards demands for democracy. Obvious examples of this are Singapore's resort to a quasi-onc-party regime since 1965 and Indonesia's shift to a highly authoritar ian 'Panca Sila democracy' based on the state-controlled Golkar organisation, the armed forces' civic-mission type 'dual function' and a highly conformist, patrimonialist political system. Moreover, specific local factors may also come into play in varying degrees, such as the ethnic cleavage in Malaysia, where the Malays have long feared they might become subordinated in their own land by the wealthy Chinese minority, or the acute sense of vulnerability felt by the Chinese in tiny Singapore. Hence:
The four anomalous cases do not ... contradict the argument that high economic development strengthens the forces leading towards democrati sation. What they do show is that the impact of economic development must be weighed in the context of other forces, which may strengthen or weaken it ... Our analysis [is put forward] ... not as a formula for precise prediction, but as an instrument for sensitising one to some of the more po tent forces with which we shall all have to grapple. (Crouch & Morley, 1998) Among die 'other forces' which enter die equadon as intermediate variables, ac cording to Croucb and Morley, are geographical factors (varying from Singapore's extreme smallness and sense of vulnerability to China's immense size and Indone sia's potendally fissiparous character), polidcal culture, deeply entrenched polidcal insdtudons, elite cohesiveness, social factors such as communal divisions and social stradficadon, and vulnerability to external pressures. The influence of dominadng personalides (Lee Kuan Yew, Suharto, Sukarno, Marcos and Mao Tse-tung most obviously, but several odiers too) has often been significant in direcdng dieir na-tion's course towards either authoritarianism or democracy. Hence any enquiry into die strength of democratising forces in diese countries must look beyond mere economic indicators like growth rates or per capita income levels, as if diese were die key determinants, to take account of die intricacies ol dieir history and polidcs also.
It is here diat die various odier issues raised in die studies by O 'Donnell et al. (1986) ol 'transidons lrom audioritarianism' also become relevant to any investigadon into die issues under scrudny here. They have not had much attendon in die Soudieast Asian context, however, not least because die only clear-cut examples of such transidons so lar have been die overdirow of Marcos in die Philippines in 1986 (Mackie, 1993 (Mackie, , 1998 , of die military junta in Thailand in 1992, and of Su harto in 1998. A more fruitful approach to diese matters in die various Soudieast Asian countries may be along die lines ol Haggard and Kaufmann's (1995) analysis ol the relevance ol institutional factors to regime change or survival, eidier audioritarian or democratic:
I he ability of bodi audioritarian and democratic leaders to maintain power is a function of economic performance, which in turn is dependent on the conduct of economic policy. Institutions affect die coherence of policy bodi in die initiation phase, when executive audiority is an asset, and during die consolidation phase when success rests on building bases of social sup port. (Haggard & Kaufmann, 1995:10) 1 his approach directs our attention to die sustainability ol democratic institutions and processes after any transition from authoritarianism has occurred, which is likely to be a matter of crucial importance in die long run. Democratisation cannot be regarded as just a linear, one-way process, in any part of die world.
I here are strong grounds lor doubting dial transitions from audioritarian into democratic regimes will prove sustainable unless dicy have established 'die social supports diat usually only advanced economies can supply' (Crouch & Morley, 1998) . 1 he decisions ol political actors may be crucial for determining the immedi ate direction and timing of regime changes, but diey are made 'in a social context in which die level ol economic development remains a fundamental element and one diat is likely to have a serious impact on die sustainability of any changes made' (Crouch & Morley, 1998) . In short, poor and crisis-prone countries are likely to have trouble maintaining democratic regimes, even if diey are fortunate enough to achieve diem, whereas more prosperous countries have better chances of doing so provided diey too have been fortunate enough to achieve diem, which is not al ways the case.
